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I.  Abstract 
This study examines the informal institutions that govern the ​sāqiya​ and ​khettāra 
irrigation system in southeastern Morocco. I frame those institutions using literature concerning 
politics of irrigation, governing the commons, and North African political culture. While 
interviewing farmers in agricultural communities near the Morocco-Algeria border, five themes 
emerged as key aspects of sāqiya and khettāra governance: the definitions of irrigation 
communities, the methods of water distribution, the institutions for selecting leaders, and those 
leaders’ authorities and responsibilities. Institutional arrangements and management practices 
associated with those themes show that sāqiya and khettāra governance is rooted in the 
democratic values of consensus and consultation. The presence of indigenous democratic 
institutions in southeastern Moroccan farming communities contradicts scholars who claim an 
inherent incompatibility between North African culture and democratic institutions. The study 
also examines how grassroots irrigation institutions respond to social, economic and 
environmental challenges. 
II. Introduction 
Although my research focuses on farmers in the Moroccan desert, my path began in New 
Mexico. In my home state of New Mexico, people understand the importance of water. A 
centuries-old irrigation system made up of communally managed canals called ​acequias 
crisscrosses New Mexico’s arid landscape, providing water to farming communities around the 
state. I grew up hearing stories from my mother and grandparents about playing along the 
acequia, riding horses beside it, and disputing the right to use its waters. As a teenager, I once 
worked on an alfalfa farm that irrigates with the acequia. When my brother purchased his first 
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house in Socorro, he bought a property abutting an acequia. The acequia frequently appears in 
folklore and history, flowing through the stories New Mexicans tell about ourselves.  
I first visited Morocco in 2016 and felt at home in the country’s southern desert, which 
sits at the northern edge of the Sahara. Buildings constructed from mud-brick and straw 
reminded me of New Mexican adobe, a word that comes from the Arabic ​al-tūb​. Moroccan 
jewelry resembles that of the Diné and Hopi people of the American Southwest, who learned to 
work silver from Spaniards who in turn learned from Arab and Amazigh people from Morocco.  
In Morocco, I remembered the histories, traditions, and legends that linked New Mexico 
to North Africa. Seven centuries of Islamic civilization in Spain have left their mark on former 
Spanish colonies like New Mexico. In 711, Tariq ibn Ziyad led an army of Arab and Amazigh 
soldiers across the strait of Gibraltar, which comes from the Arabic words meaning “Tariq’s 
mountain,” marking the beginning Muslim presence in the Iberian Peninsula. North African 
culture entered the Iberian mainstream, famously influencing language, architecture, and cuisine. 
Only in 1491 did Spanish armies topple the last Muslim emirate in Granada, completing the 
Reconquista. Even so, Muslims remained in Spain for over a century. Despite the Catholic 
monarchy’s efforts to stamp out heresy in a series of inquisitions, Muslims secretly expressed 
their culture and practiced their religion. Muslims faced the choice to either publicly convert to 
Christianity or seek refuge far from the reaches of Spanish authority; some fled to Islamic states 
in the Middle East and North Africa while others settled in Spain’s American colonies.  1
In the wake of the Reconquista and the Inquisition, the first Spanish expedition entered 
New Mexico in the 1530s. Among them was Estebanico the Moor, a slave from the Moroccan 
1 Karoline Cook,​ Forbidden Passages​ (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2016). 
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port of Azemmour. In 1598, the conquistador Juan de Oñate led a company of colonists, 
missionaries, and soldiers to return to New Mexico, occupying the Tewa village of Ohkay 
Owingeh and initiating what would be two centuries of Spanish colonization. Oñate’s party and 
their successors carried with them a culture significantly impacted by North Africa. That culture 
remains prominent in New Mexico today.  
I had read that the acequia came to New Mexico from Spain but originated with “the 
Moors,” the name that Spaniards called Arab and Amazigh people from North Africa.  Visiting 2
the town of Merzouga, a popular tourist destination near the Algerian border, I first learned that 
people in Morocco still irrigate using the sāqiya, which gave the acequia its name.  I knew that a 3
system of “water democracy” and communal ownership governs the New Mexican acequia.  I 4
wanted to find out whether Moroccan sāqiya users govern their system with similar institutions. 
Upon returning to the United States, I applied for a grant to compare traditional water politics in 
New Mexico and Morocco. 
Using a grant from the Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College, I set out to compare 
the institutions that govern the sāqiya and the acequia. I was particularly interested in whether I 
would encounter democratic institutions in Morocco similar to the ones I knew in New Mexico. 
Skeptics about democracy and democratization in the Middle East and North Africa often argue 
that the region is not ready for democratic institutions. I wanted to determine whether indigenous 
democratic institutions exist on the local level to contribute to a better understanding of 
grassroots political culture in the region. Thanks to the support of the Honors College, my 
2 Gustavo Arellano,​ Enduring Acequias ​(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 2014), 27-31. 
3 Thomas Glick, ​Irrigation and Society in Medieval Valencia ​(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 
221. 
4 Jose Rivera, ​Acequia Culture ​(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1998), 77-145. 
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curiosity has evolved into this thesis, which examines the institutions that govern the sāqiya and 
khettāra system of southeastern Morocco. 
Research Question 
I formulated a question to guide my research: ​How do local stakeholders manage the 
khettāra and sāqiya irrigation system in Drâa-Tafilalet Province of Morocco? Based on 
institutions for acequia governance in New Mexico, I hypothesized that local stakeholders 
manage the khettāra and sāqiya irrigation system in southeastern Morocco using informal 
democratic political institutions. 
Importance 
This study is significant because it contributes to understanding rural North African 
political culture and the social impact of water scarcity. Even after the Arab Revolts of 2011, 
authoritarian, undemocratic governments continue to dominate Middle Eastern and North 
African states. However, claims that the region’s culture is inherently unfit for democratic 
governance overlook the small-scale, indigenous political structures that form the basis of a 
society’s political culture. Assumptions about democratic political culture have tangible impacts 
on policy decisions towards the region. Recognizing the presence of indigenous, grassroots 
democratic institutions could affect the ways that policymakers view democratization. This study 
demonstrates that local water politics in southeastern Morocco exhibit a democratic political 
culture at the informal, local level. The research focuses specifically on grassroots institutions in 
which legitimacy derives from the members of a community and authority emanates from the 
bottom-up. 
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As the effects of global warming intensify, understanding the underlying grassroots 
structures that govern water resources may help communities respond to water scarcity. Morocco 
experiences severe water scarcity that is especially acute in the country’s deserts.  The kingdom 5
also suffers from intense periods of drought that sometimes leave regions of the country without 
rain for months at a time.  The consequences of such droughts can be catastrophic, resulting in 6
loss of crops, food shortages, and rural-to-urban migration.  A 2015 drought depressed economic 7
growth to just 1.5 percent due to crop failures.  Climatological studies agree that, while global 8
warming will not dramatically increase the frequency of droughts, it will quicken their onset and 
exacerbate their intensity.  In the 20th century, the Moroccan government responded to droughts 9
by investing in large-scale, centralized irrigation projects, largely overlooking community-based 
irrigation.  However, centralized irrigation projects rarely succeed in the long term, calling for a 10
closer examination of small, more sustainable irrigation communities like the ones I researched.  11
Global warming will impact Morocco’s arid irrigation communities in various ways. 
Irrigation using systems such as the sāqiya and khettāra can help mitigate the effects of 
decreasing rainfall to an extent, but water scarcity places pressures on the social and political 
institutions that govern and sustain irrigation systems. Studying how communities govern 
irrigation systems could help determine the capacity of irrigation to absorb environmental shocks 
and sustain farmers’ livelihoods. Because forty percent of the Moroccan population works in the 
5 Hamza Guessous, “Morocco Among Countries Facing Water Scarcity,” Morocco World News, February 
15, 2018, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2018/02/240719/morocco-countries-facing-water-scarcity/. 
6 Richards et al, ​A Political Economy of the Middle East ​(New York: Westview Press, 2013), 172. 
7 Richards et al, ​A Political Economy of the Middle East​, 172. 
8 World Bank, “5 things Morocco is doing about Climate Change,” accessed April 19, 2019, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2016/11/17/5-things-morocco-is-doing-about-climate-change. 
9 Kevin Trenberth et al, “Global Warming and Changes in Drought,” Nature Climate Change 4, no. 1 
(2014): 17. 
10  Alan Richards et al, ​A Political Economy of the Middle East​, 172. 
11 Jonathan Mabry, ​Canals and Communities ​(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2001), 21. 
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agricultural sector, examining local political institutions for irrigation is especially important.  12
Institutional collapse due to environmental change could also spur internal migration, increase 
dependence on outside food sources, and contribute to conflict. 
Geography of Southeastern Morocco 
Morocco is situated at a crossroads between Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Arab 
world. Morocco’s contemporary culture results from an indigenous Amazigh foundation overlaid 
with Arab conquest followed by a slow process of Arabization and then French and Spanish 
imperialism. My research focuses on oasis villages in the southeastern Moroccan desert, which 
have distinct cultural, political, and environmental characteristics. I focus on communities in the 
Drâa-Tafilalet region of Morocco and especially villages near the Ziz Oasis in the Tafilalet area. 
Figure 2.1 shows the locations of my interview sites within Morocco while Figure 2.2 shows 
them relative to the Morocco-Algeria border. Some important geographical characteristics of 
southeastern Morocco are its high concentration of Amazigh people, its location at the edge of 
the Sahara desert, and its cultural and political marginality within Morocco and the broader Arab 
world. 
12 Hafez Ghanem, "Agriculture and Rural Development for Inclusive Growth and Food Security in 
Morocco," 1, Brookings Institution, published February 2015, 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Agriculture_WEB_Revised.pdf.. 
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Figure 2.1: Map of interview sites within Morocco. 
Figure 2.2: Map of interview sites relative to the Moroccan-Algerian border. 
Key: 1: Merzouga, 2: Hassi Labied, 3: Haroun, 4: Fezna and Walad Jalal, 5: Khettāret A’ashīsh 
Before Arabs arrived in North Africa in the eighth century, Amazigh people, often known 
in the English-language discourse as Berbers, lived in the region for millennia.  Gradually, 13
Amazigh and Arab people intermarried and the indigenous Amazigh culture mixed with the 
exogenous Arab one. Today, most Moroccans have Amazigh ancestry but fewer of them speak 
Amazigh languages, which are distantly related to Arabic but not mutually intelligible. Morocco 
ranks first among North African countries in terms of speakers of Amazigh languages, with 
13 Bruce Maddy-Weitzmann, ​The Berber Identity Movement and the Challenge to North African States ​( 
Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012.), 13-33. 
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approximately 40 to 45 percent of Moroccans speaking Tamazight, Tashelhit, and Tarifit.  Both 14
Amazigh and Arab tribes reside in southeastern Morocco.   
Figure 2.3: Map of Tamazgha. 
The traditional Amazigh homeland is Tamazgha, which stretches from Egypt’s Siwa 
oasis in the east to the Canary Islands in the west and from the Mediterranean in the north to just 
beyond cities like Gao, Mali and Agades, Niger in the south.  In much of Tamazgha, an 15
Amazigh substratum influences contemporary culture. Although Morocco has an especially high 
proportion of Tamazight speakers today, Amazigh culture extends across North Africa; 
Morocco’s evident Amazigh influence alongside Arab culture does not divide it from North 
Africa but rather connects it to populations across the region. Figure 2.3 shows the historical 
extent of Tamazgha according to Amazigh nationalist narratives.  
Southeastern Morocco is located at the northern edge of the Sahara Desert. Deserts 
constitute ninety percent of Algeria, two-thirds of Tunisia, and half of Morocco.  Arid regions 16
face environmental challenges unlike those in temperate areas, meaning that desert societies 
develop solutions suiting their ecologies. Rissani, a town where I conducted research, receives an 
14 Maddy-Weitzmann, ​The Berber Identity Movement and the Challenge to North African States​, 1. 
15 Maddy-Weitzmann, ​The Berber Identity Movement and the Challenge to North African States​, 4. 
16 Will Swearingen and Abdellatif Bencherifa, ​The North African Environment at Risk ​(Oxford: Westview 
Press, 1997), 4. 
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average of two inches of rainfall annually, necessitating irrigation to grow crops.  Due to 17
dwindling water supplies and a growing population, Morocco has declined from 2500 cubic 
meters of water per person per year in 1960 to just 500 cubic meters in 2018, putting it well 
below the water scarcity threshold of 1000 cubic meters.  Southeastern Morocco’s desert 18
geography also renders it more vulnerable to the impact of climate change than other parts of the 
country. In particular, arid areas of Morocco experience vegetation loss that contributes to 
desertification.  Vegetation loss especially impacts people living in oases as the desert 19
encroaches on their communities. Climate change caused the Sahara Desert to expand about 10 
percent from 1920 to 2013, including northward expansion into areas of North Africa.  20
Desertification will likely continue. 
Although oases in North African deserts once enjoyed extensive political power and 
cultural influence, arid regions have generally experienced underdevelopment and neglect since 
the colonial period.  Ralph Austen’s book, ​Trans-Saharan Africa in World History, ​and​ ​Eamon 21
Gearon’s ​The Sahara: A Cultural History ​both​ ​present histories centered on the Sahara. Austen 
and Gearon show that the world’s largest warm weather desert contained a vital commercial 
network connecting sub-Saharan Africa to the Mediterranean coast to transport salt, gold, and 
slaves.  Many people in southeastern Morocco descend from nomads who participated in the 22
17 Ronald Messier and James Miller, ​The Last Civilized Place ​(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2016.), 
39. 
18 Hamza Guessous, “Morocco Among Countries Facing Water Scarcity,” Morocco World News, February 
15, 2018, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2018/02/240719/morocco-countries-facing-water-scarcity/. 
19 Hespress, “Fezna: jamā’a qarawiyya bi-iqlīm Errachidia tetekayyef ma’ taghayur al-munākh", May 1, 
2016, https://www.hespress.com/regions/304153.html. 
20 Natalie Thomas and Sumant Nigam, “Twentieth-Century Climate Change over Africa,” ​Journal of 
Climate​ 31, no. 9 (March 28, 2018): 3349. 
21 Swearingen and Bencherifa, ​The North African Environment at Risk​, 5. 
22 Eamonn Gearon, ​The Sahara: A Cultural History​ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Austen, 
Ralph A. ​Trans-Saharan Africa in World History​, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).  
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trans-Saharan trade before transitioning to agricultural production and more recently the tourism 
industry. The introduction of hard borders after independence, as well as a decades-long border 
war with Algeria, all but ended the nomadic lifestyle. After World War II, formerly nomadic 
populations settled into villages, which added a new layer to a landscape previously dominated 
by mud-brick castles called ​qsūr​ (s. ​qsar​).   23
The southeastern Moroccan oasis city of Sijilmassa, located near Rissani, prospered as a 
center of commerce, political power, and scholarship for centuries.  As the last major trading 24
post before the Sahara, Sijilmassa maintained a lively trade with cities like Aoudaghost in 
present-day Mauritania.  Controlling Sijilmassa became a stepping stone for aspiring rulers such 25
as the Almoravids, who launched their 13th-century conquest of Morocco from the port at the 
edge of the desert. Ever since the Bani Midrar dynasty founded Sijilmassa in the eighth century, 
irrigation sustained the town and its inhabitants. Sijilmassa’s first known irrigation canal, the 
sāqiya midrariyya​, dates back to the Bani Midrar, who ruled the city until the late tenth century.
 Canal irrigation in medieval Sijilmassa expanded as the city integrated into the Almohad and 26
Almoravid empires. Oral tradition and archaeological evidence agree that a network of sawāqi (s. 
sāqiya) linked the Ziz and Gheris Rivers to farmland that nourished a major urban center.  27
However, Sijilmassa’s importance declined as new trade centers rose to prominence in southern 
Algeria and elsewhere. Locally, fortified villages in the Tafilalet Oasis, which surrounds the Ziz 
River, dominated the area while Sijilmassa fell into disrepair.  28
23 Susanne Steinmann, “Gender, Pastoralism, and Intensification: Changing Environmental Resource Use in 
Morocco,”​ Yale Forestry & Environmental Studies Bulletin​ 103: 81. 
24 Messier and Miller,  ​The​ ​Last Civilized Place, ​26. 
25 François-Xavier Fauvelle, ​The Golden Rhinoceros ​(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.), 53. 
26 Messier and Miller,  ​The​ ​Last Civilized Place, ​8. 
27 Messier and Miller, ​The Last Civilized Place​, 51. 
28 Fauvelle, ​The Golden Rhinoceros​, 116. 
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Morocco’s royal family, the Alawites, emerged as princes of Tafilalet before conquering 
the country in the 17th century. Just as the Almoravids did centuries before them, the Alawites 
consolidated power in Tafilalet and used it to launch a national conquest. Under the Alawites, 
Tafilalet fell to the margins of a kingdom centered in Fes. Tafilalet remains marginal; the 
vestiges of the royal family’s Tafilalet roots are limited to an Alawite research center and the 
mausoleum of a prominent Alawite prince. Passing the ruins of Sijilmassa, few visitors to the 
area realize that they look upon one of medieval North Africa’s greatest cities. 
Figure 2.4: Map showing the countries of the Maghreb. 
Located at the edge of Morocco, which is itself at the periphery of the Arab world, 
southeastern Morocco is doubly marginalized. Arabic speakers call Morocco “al-Maghreb,” a 
word that can also refer to the countries of North Africa shown in Figure 1.4. The word Maghreb 
means “western place” because it lies far to the west of traditional Arab power centers like 
Baghdad, Damascus, and Cairo. The division between the Maghreb in the west of the Arab world 
and the Mashreq in the east carries a political dimension as well. Long distances from centers of 
Arab power in Damascus and Baghdad have historically afforded the Maghreb with a large 
degree of autonomy under various Islamic empires. That autonomy has manifested itself in 
regional kingdoms such as the Almoravids, Almohads, Marinids, Hafsids and Barbary states. It 
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would be a mistake to confuse autonomy for isolation, however. On the contrary, Morocco has 
been an important participant in both Saharan and Mediterranean political, commercial, and 
social systems despite its distance from their centers. 
In the contemporary Maghreb, economic activity and political authority center on urban 
areas in the Mediterranean climes of the northern coast. Therefore, southeastern Morocco lies on 
the margin of the country. Within Morocco, a traditional internal distinction divides ​bilād 
al-makhzan​, the land of the royal court, from ​bilād al-sība​, the land of anarchy.  29
 In recent history, southeastern Morocco has belonged to ​bilād al-sība​ and therefore did 
not see extensive investment in large-scale, centrally planned irrigation projects.  Bureaucracies 30
managed those large-scale irrigation projects with limited involvement from farmers.  While 31
large-scale irrigation predominates in coastal lowlands of the makhzan, traditional, communally 
managed irrigation systems such as the sāqiya and khettāra prevail in the desert.  Villages built 32
in the 20th century adopted those centuries-old systems even as the Moroccan government 
invested in large water projects elsewhere. Tribes in southeastern Morocco, especially the Ait 
Khabbash, earned a reputation for rebelling against French colonial rule and have at times 
enjoyed de facto independence from the Moroccan state. The context of quasi-independence 
facilitated the development of grassroots political institutions, often related to the tribe rather 
than the state, throughout bilād al-sība.   33
29  Joffé, “Traditions of Governance in North Africa,” 726. 
30 Swearingen, ​Moroccan Mirages​, 11. 
31 Marcel Kuper et al, “Supporting the Shift from State Water to Community Water,” ​Ecology and Society 
14, no. 1 (2009): 132-148. 
32 Swearingen, ​Moroccan Mirages​, 11. 
33 Joffé, “Traditions of Governance in North Africa,” 727. 
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Describing the Saqiya and Khettara  
The sāqiya and khettāra are physical structures, the former a canal and the latter a tunnel, 
that carry water from a source to a population center for irrigation. In addition to the tangible 
elements of the sāqiya and khettāra, a set of norms and practices govern the sāqiya, the khettāra, 
and their waters within a small community of farmers. Although the sāqiya and khettāra can exist 
independently, my research occurred in communities that use a connected sāqiya and khettāra 
system.  
The khettāra is a tunnel dug at a slight decline to allow water to flow from one location to 
another using gravity.  A khettāra relies on a water table at one point that is higher than the 34
ground level at another point. For example, a khettāra may carry mountain spring water 
underground because the khettāra’s tunnel slants downwards, but the surface slants to a lesser 
degree.  Thus, the khettāra eventually surfaces even as gravity continues to pull the water that 35
flows through it. 
Figure 2.5 (Courtesy of Google Earth): A khettara from above. Figure 2.6 (Courtesy of Said 
al-Fallah) 
 
34 Interview wih Muhammad Aoujil, November 6, 2017. 
35 Interview with Muhammad Lquz, December 20, 2017 
 
Chappell 17 
Figure 2.7 (Courtesy of Said al-Fallah): An empty khettāra. 
People construct khettārat by digging wells and then connecting them laterally with a 
tunnel.  Figure 2.7 shows the inside of an empty khettāra tunnel. A functioning khettāra would 36
be full of water. Those wells also serve as access shafts for maintenance and are surrounded by a 
mound on the surface that allows the shaft openings to remain visible after a sandstorm.  From a 37
bird's eye view, a khettāra appears to be a line of wells leading towards a population center, as 
Figure 2.5 shows.  
Once a khettāra reaches a population center, it surfaces to become a sāqiya. The sāqiya 
continues at a slight decline and runs perpendicular to a row of fields, which are themselves 
arranged at an incline so that they descend away from the sāqiya. Those fields are typically 
located at the edge of a ​wād​, an ephemeral riverbed that accumulates water after major rainfall.  38
The arrangement of the sāqiya and adjacent fields facilitate the controlled flooding of 
agricultural plots. Figure 2.8 shows a sāqiya running alongside crops in Merzouga. 
36 Interview with Said al-Fellah, December 18, 2017. 
37 Interview with Said al-Fellah, December 18, 2017. 
38 Interview with Muhammad Aoujil, November 6, 2017. 
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Figure 2.8: The sāqiya of Tamazant in Merzouga. 
 Institutional and technological relatives of both the sāqiya and khettāra, which overlap in 
southeastern Morocco, have spread across the world in parallel with imperial expansion, 
religious proselytism, and settler colonialism. The Arab world in general and the Maghreb in 
particular contain large numbers of khettāra-related systems. However, other patterns of 
proliferation go far beyond the Arab world. Systems related to the khettāra are used in places as 
disparate as Mexico, Oman, and China.  After the sāqiya reached al-Andalus, as Muslims called 39
the Iberian Peninsula, it remained a part of southern Spanish agricultural life long after the 
Reconquista and eventually arrived in Spain’s colonies. 
Definitions 
This study will use the terms “stakeholders” and “irrigation community,” in reference to 
the group of people who use, govern, and manage the sāqiya and khettāra. The ​shaykh as-sāqiya 
(p.​ shyūkh as-sāqiya​) is the person an irrigation community elects to oversee the sāqiya and 
khettāra. “Water chief” or “irrigation chief” are approximate English translations for shaykh 
as-sāqiya. 
39 Dale Lightfoot, "Moroccan Khettara: Traditional Irrigation and Progressive Desiccation," ​Geoforum​ 27, 
no. 2 (1996): 262; Scarborough, ​The Flow of Power​, 45 
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This research adopts Elinor Ostrom’s definition of institutions. Ostrom defines 
institutions as “the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and 
structures, including those with/in families, neighborhoods, markets, firms, sports leagues, 
churches, private associations, and governments at all scales.”  Therefore, I refer to the practices 40
and norms that govern the sāqiya and khettāra as institutions because irrigation is a repetitive act 
within a community. 
III. Literature Review 
In examining the governance of southeastern Moroccan irrigation systems, this research 
contributes to studies on irrigation and governance in North Africa by utilizing a theoretical 
framework that combines governing the commons and democratic political culture. In particular, 
the research shows that informal democratic institutions govern the sāqiya and khettāra irrigation 
system. Therefore, a variety of historical, ethnographical, and political works concerning 
political institutions, water, and environment inform my research, complement my primary 
sources, and reinforce my conclusions. The literature on the politics of irrigation provides a 
comparative functional lens for understanding the sāqiya and khettāra in relation to similar 
systems around the world. My theoretical framework combines two conceptual lenses: 
institutions for governing the commons and traditions of North African political culture. 
Together, those lenses form the conceptual scaffolding for this research to complement the 
functional aspect.  
40 Elinor Ostrom, ​Understanding Institutional Diversity ​(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 3. 
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Politics of Irrigation 
Many scholars have written on the role of irrigation in forming political structures and 
vice versa. Early literature on water politics focused on large-scale, centralized irrigation 
projects. Karl Wittfogel’s 1957 book ​Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power 
argued that entrenched, centralized political power grew out of despotic states’ control of large 
water projects. Wittfogel’s theory of hydraulic despotism stimulated academic discussion about 
the relationship between water and political institutions. However, Wittfogel primarily discusses 
models of large-scale state coercion rather than small-scale community cooperation. Even in his 
discussion of relatively decentralized systems of political control in feudal Europe, rigid social 
and political hierarchies mark institutions of resource management. Wittfogel’s model does not 
apply to the sāqiya and khettāra system, where authority rises from the bottom up instead of 
descending from the top down.  
The sixty years since Wittfogel’s writing have seen rising interest in small-scale irrigation 
and grassroots political institutions. ​My research shows an example of an arid irrigation system 
with governing institutions based on consensus and representation, thereby also challenging the 
conclusions of Clifford Geertz. Geertz’s “The Wet and the Dry” compares the environmental 
politics of two small-scale irrigation systems, one in Bali and the other in Morocco. Geertz 
argues that arid regions are characterized by less democratic forms of water governance than 
water-rich regions. According to Geertz, “it is in part that [arid] climate which projects the aura 
of irregularity and tension,” thereby incentivizing competition for water resources instead of 
cooperation.  In her article on the Seguia Khrichfra irrigation system in northern Morocco, 41
41 Clifford Geertz, “The Wet and the Dry,” ​Human Ecology​ 1, no. 1 (1972):38. 
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Saskia van der Kooij reinforces Geertz’s assertion that “what institutions are and what they do is 
intimately linked to the types of distributional dilemmas they have to deal with.”  Whereas van 42
der Kooij does not challenge Geertz’s correlation between aridity and social tension, John 
Welch’s chapter in ​Canals and Communities ​does just that. Welch demonstrates that there is not 
a significant correlation between the availability of water and the extent of democratic 
governance institutions for that water.  Geertz’s article and Welch’s response presents an 43
argument within the field of political ecology about how arid climates impact political 
institutions. My research builds on Welch’s argument by showing well-functioning arid 
irrigation systems based on communal cooperation. 
The khettāra belongs to a global family of ​qanāt​ systems, which are underground tunnels 
for transporting groundwater. Originating in ancient Persia, qanāt systems spread throughout the 
Persian Empire before Arabs adopted the technology and brought it with them across North 
Africa. Also called foggāra, khettāra, falaj, and kārez, qanāt systems exist in various parts of the 
world and are especially prevalent in the Middle East and North Africa. Analyses of qanāt 
systems originate in a wide range of disciplines and provide methodological guidance as well as 
points of comparison for my thesis. Remini Boualem’s article on the foggara in southern Algeria 
proves that the pairing of qanāt and sāqiya systems is not limited to Morocco, but rather extends 
to other parts of Saharan North Africa.  The geographer Dale Lightfoot has written extensively 44
on qanāt systems, including the khettāra of Morocco. His work clarifies the technical 
42 Saskia Van der Kooij, Margreet Zwarteveen, and Marcel Kuper "The Material of the Social: The Mutual 
Shaping of Institutions by Irrigation Technology and Society in Seguia Khrichfa, Morocco," ​International Journal 
of the Commons​ 9, no. 1 (March 16, 2015): 131. 
43 John Welch, “The Dry and the Drier” in Canals and Communities, ed. Jonathan Mabry (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 1996), 69-87. 
44 Remini Boualem, Achour Bachir, and Kechad Rabah, "The Foggara: A Traditional System Of Irrigation 
In Arid Regions," ​GeoScience Engineering​ 60, no. 2 (2014): 31.  
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functionality of the khettāra and inspired me to use satellite imagery to show the physical 
structures of the sāqiya and khettāra. Most research on qanat systems primarily addresses their 
history, construction, and function. My research fills a gap in the literature by analyzing the 
social and political institutions associated with the khettāra.  
On a larger scale, some scholars have drawn from a broad range of case studies to come 
to general conclusions about the politics of irrigation. Jonathan Mabry’s ​Canals and 
Communities ​and Vernon Scarborough’s ​The Flow of Power​ help contextualize the khettāra and 
sāqiya governance system among other methods of governing small-scale and traditional 
irrigation systems. Mabry’s book features two chapters explicitly dedicated to irrigation in 
Morocco.  Scarborough and Mabry provide this research with functional frameworks applicable 45
to water politics and show the importance of governing institutions around irrigation. 
A wealth of academic literature focuses on the New Mexican acequia system, an extant 
system of small-scale irrigation related to the sāqiya. The acequia evolved from Morocco’s 
sāqiya by way of Spain, exists in a similar environmental context, and uses similar governance 
structures, therefore warranting a brief discussion of acequia institutions to inform this research. 
Juan Arellano, a New Mexican poet and writer, describes the cultural origins and role of the 
acequia in New Mexican society, including mention of the acequia’s ties to Morocco.  Jose 46
Rivera provides a more academic analysis of the history and political culture of acequia 
communities as well as their contemporary role in rural New Mexico. Arellano’s and Rivera’s 
books on the acequia helped me understand the informal political institutions that surround 
small-scale irrigation in arid regions. Rivera describes acequia governance as “a system of direct 
45 Mabry, ​Canals and Communities​, chapters 4 and 6.  
46 Arellano, ​Enduring Acequias​, 27. 
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democracy where all irrigators participate in the functioning and operations of their institution.”  47
In an article co-written with Thomas Glick, a historian of medieval Spain, Rivera remarks that 
“irrigators own the acequia watercourses, regulate them, police them, and maintain them from 
generation to generation, all the while perpetuating a sense of place and a system of direct, 
participatory democracy.”  Glick and Rivera’s description of the New Mexican acequia could 48
just as well apply to the Moroccan sāqiya. They also write that water democracy is not limited to 
New Mexico; they says “the acequia persists as a transplanted Iberian civil and social institution” 
and that the Iberian institution has Islamic origins.  This research takes Rivera’s work a step 49
further by directly examining the institutions of Morocco’s sāqiya communities, partially through 
the lens of the acequia. 
Theoretical Framework 
Approaching the sāqiya and khettāra from the perspectives of neo-institutionalism and 
regional political culture, I selected two discrete bodies of relevant academic literature: theory on 
governing the commons and theory on democratic institutions in North Africa.  
Because the sāqiya and khettāra irrigation system is communally owned, used, and 
governed, political theory concerning governing the commons frames my research. In particular, 
Elinor Ostrom’s books on institutions and common-pool resources analyze how societies govern 
the commons. Ostrom identifies a tension between scholars who propose that the state can best 
govern common resources and those who believe that the free market ought to regulate those 
resources.  In response, Ostrom observes that “communities of individuals have relied on 50
47 Rivera, ​Acequia Culture,​ xxi. 
48 Jose Rivera and Thomas Glick, “Iberian Origins of New Mexico’s Community Acequias,” accessed 
March 18, 2019, http://www.newmexicohistory.org/people/iberian-origins-of-new-mexicos-community-acequias. 
49 Rivera and Glick, “Iberian Origins of New Mexico’s Community Acequias.” 
50 Elinor Ostrom, ​Governing the Commons​ (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press, 1990.), 1. 
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institutions resembling neither the state nor the market to govern some resource systems with 
reasonable degrees of success over long periods of time.”  She also critiques previous models 51
used to understand the commons, particularly the tragedy of the commons,  the prisoner’s 52
dilemma,  and the logic of collective action. Each of those models indicates that people 53
prioritize their individual welfare over collective welfare, leading to the degradation of shared 
resources. Ostrom asserts that no single solution can apply to every case of communal resource 
management. She also writes that in the tragedy of the commons, prisoner’s dilemma, and logic 
of collective action models “individuals are perceived as being trapped in a static situation, 
unable to change the rules affecting their incentives.”  Instead of relying on models and 54
metaphors, Ostrom turns to empirical evidence -- real-world communities of individuals who 
have constructed cooperative institutions to successfully and sustainably govern common-pool 
resources. In Ostrom’s assessment, institutions that govern the commons often transcend the neat 
public-private dichotomy that has informed policymakers. Ostrom does not explicitly employ the 
language of democracy. However, her descriptions of self-governing communities that practice 
collective decision-making, build accountability structures, and establish and enforce norms can 
serve as a bridge connecting common-pool resource governance to democratic political culture. 
Ostrom uses case studies that, like the sāqiya and khettāra irrigation system, are 
self-organized and self-governed. The institutions in her case studies involve relatively small 
communities and govern scarce renewable resources that are vital to economic productivity.  55
51 Ostrom, ​Governing the Commons​, 1. 
52 Ostrom’s work challenges James Hardin’s influential 1968 article “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 
which asserts that individual incentives to overuse communal resources lead to their depletion. 
53 The prisoners’ dilemma is a game that shows why rational actors may choose not to cooperate, even 
though it may be in their best interest to do so. The game is often used to explain cooperative situations. 
54 Ostrom, ​Governing the Commons​, 182. 
55 Elinor Ostrom, ​Governing the Common​s, 26, 182. 
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The small irrigation communities that govern water in southeastern Morocco fit in well with 
Ostrom’s analysis, although she does not specifically discuss them. However, many of Ostrom’s 
case studies come from other irrigation systems, including the ​huerta ​system of Valencia  and 56
the ​zanjera​ system of the Philippines.  Both of those systems bear close institutional 57
resemblance to the sāqiya and khettāra system in terms of water allocation methods, governance 
structure, and the rights and responsibilities of elected leaders. The historical connections 
between Morocco and Spain during the Andalusian period and between Spain and the 
Philippines from the 16th to 19th centuries indicate that the huerta, zanjera, and sāqiya may 
derive from common roots in medieval Morocco. 
This research shows that grassroots water politics in rural southeastern Morocco are part 
of a democratic political culture. Using case studies from rural irrigation communities in 
southeastern Morocco, I apply Ostrom’s work on managing of common-pool resources to 
counter claims that regional culture makes the Middle East and North Africa unsuitable for 
democratic governance. Amartya Sen proposed the universality of democratic values, but George 
Joffé specifically highlighted institutions based on consensus and consultation in the North 
African context. My research shows those values of consensus and consultation extend to 
governing the sāqiya and khettāra system.  
Amartya Sen’s 1999 article “Democracy as a Universal Value” refutes claims of inherent 
cultural incompatibility with democratic governance.  Sen makes the case that societies around 58
the world value the underlying principles of liberal democracy, including allegedly illiberal 
societies in the Muslim world. He acknowledges that opposition to democratic practices can be 
56 Elinor Ostrom, ​Governing the Commons,​ 26. 
57 Elinor Ostrom, ​Governing the Commons​, 82. 
58 Amartya Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” ​Journal of Democracy​ 10 (3): 3-17. 
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found in intellectual traditions around the world, including those from western Europe. On the 
other hand, he also points to the diversity of Islamic, Chinese and Indian intellectual traditions, 
all of which contain schools of thought that recognize the value of democracy. However, Sen’s 
argument primarily addresses the realm of high politics and philosophy, dealing with democracy 
as a system for governing an entire state.  
Other scholars addressing the suitability of democracy in the Islamic world have also 
focused largely on state-level governance. Shadi Hamid, for instance, argues that Western liberal 
democracy is incompatible with Islamic models of governance.  Although Hamid arrives at a 59
different conclusion from Sen, he also only analyzes governance at the highest levels of the state. 
Implicit in these arguments is the assumption that democratic institutions disperse from the top 
of a society downward rather than rising from the grassroots upward. Fewer studies have focused 
on the local political institutions with which people in the Middle East and North Africa interact 
on a daily basis. Those institutions at the local level may contain guidance for forming national 
institutions that are more compatible with an existing political culture. Thus, this research 
contributes to the current discourse by showing that Sen’s core argument applies to grassroots 
institutions, using Elinor Ostrom’s framework as a lens. 
George Joffé’s 2015 article “Traditions of governance in North Africa” bridges between 
Sen’s article and the political culture of North Africa. Arguing that popular protest movements in 
North Africa have drawn from indigenous political culture in addition to Western democratic 
prescriptions, Joffé highlights a history of consultative and consensual political culture in North 
Africa. Joffé’s examples counter claims of Arab exceptionalism, which is the idea that “Arab and 
59 Shadi Hamid, ​Islamic Exceptionalism​ (New York: Saint Martins Griffin, 2017). 
 
Chappell 27 
Muslim societies are temperamentally unsuited to the complexities of democratic politics.”  60
Joffé builds on the work of anthropologists Ernest Gellner and David Hart, both of whom studied 
informal, indigenous political institutions that developed independent of the government within 
Moroccan tribal structures. According to Joffé, Gellner and Hart argued that “the concepts 
behind [indigenous political practices] did constitute a traditional political culture which should, 
as a result, still find an echo today in the much more recent political experiences of the 
contemporary countries of the Maghrib.”  Joffé goes on to analyze four cases that he claims 61
contribute to “a consensual and consultative political culture which provides a rich parallel 
tradition to the prescriptive narrative of democracy that has been articulated by the Western 
world.”  One of those cases focuses on rural political institutions in the Maghreb, while the 62
other three address Islamic ideals of governance (which are similar to those Sen describes), 
political dynamics of the Moroccan sultanate, and contemporary Maghrebi politics.  63
My research shows that the governing institutions of the sāqiya and khettāra demonstrate 
the existence of a democratic political culture in southeastern Morocco. Ostrom’s analysis helps 
my work by showing that small-scale institutions for governing common-pool resources, such as 
irrigation systems, provide fertile ground for political institutions based on consultation and 
consensus. Joffé, on the other hand, bears relevance to my research because he makes the case 
that the political culture of North Africa does not only derive from high politics. Joffé argues that 
local, indigenous institutions such as “village-based democracies” in the Algerian region of 
Kabylie and the election of Ait ‘Atta confederacy chiefs in southern Morocco call attention to a 
60 George Joffé, ​“Traditions of governance in North Africa,” ​Journal Of North African Studies​ 20, no. 5 
(December 2015):​ 723. 
61 Joffé, ​“Traditions of governance in North Africa,” 723. 
62 Joffé, ​“Traditions of governance in North Africa,” 723. 
63 Joffé, ​“Traditions of governance in North Africa,” 723-724. 
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democratic dimension of North Africa’s political culture.  My research uses Ostrom and Joffé to 64
expand on Sen’s argument, showing there is institutional diversity in the Islamic world that 
includes democratic values at the local level. 
IV. Methodology 
In December 2017, I bought a bus ticket from Meknes, where I lived at the time, to 
Merzouga. I had spent several weeks planning the trip with Youssef Aoujil, a student at Meknes’ 
Moulay Ismail University with roots in the southeast. In November, I interviewed Youssef’s 
father, Muhammad, who had farmed using the sāqiya and khettāra before joining the military and 
moving away from home. Muhammad’s interview helped orient me and informed the planning 
process. Setting out with Youssef on my third of four trips to Merzouga, I planned to speak with 
subsistence farmers about irrigation in their communities. Once we arrived, I met Youssef’s 
uncle Said, a farmer himself, who connected me with many of the participants in this study. I 
used a mix of semi-structured interviews and observations for my research. In all, I completed 
seventeen interviews with from November 6 to December 21, 2017.  
Interviews 
I chose a semi-structured format for my interviews and prepared a list of questions for my 
research.​ Interviewees answered questions concerning political structures and customs associated 
with the sāqiya and khettāra.​ ​Keeping democratic institutions in mind, I was particularly 
interested in hearing about the social contract between water users and water authorities. I also 
tried to understand the relationships between members of an irrigation community to clarify how 
power and authority are distributed within institutions. In writing my preliminary questions and 
64 Joffé, ​“Traditions of governance in North Africa,” 728. 
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asking clarifying questions, I remembered George Joffé’s concepts of consultation and 
consensus, using those as a basis for understanding how informal democratic institutions act on a 
small scale. ​The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines democracy as a “method of group 
decision making characterized by a kind of equality among the participants at an essential stage 
of the collective decision making.”  The concept of “group decision making” overlaps with 65
Joffé’s principles of consultation and consensus. ​Drawing from the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, I also paid attention to the levels of equality in participation between members of the 
irrigation community. Outside of the scope of my questions, interviewees also described 
agricultural practices, oral histories, conflict resolution mechanisms and maintenance 
requirements surrounding khettāra and sāqiya irrigation. ​The semi-structured format allowed me 
to ask follow-up questions, clarify ambiguities, and request examples. I sometimes skipped 
questions if interviewees answered them during a previous response. 
I recruited interviewees with the help of my friend Youssef Aoujil and his uncle Said 
al-Fallah, who is a farmer in the Tamazant irrigation community of Merzouga. Many of my 
interviewees were friends, neighbors, and relatives of Youssef and Said. Youssef and Said 
helped me gain trust among interviewees due to their social and cultural position in the area. I 
observed that interviewees who did not know Youssef and Said asked more questions about my 
research and motivations than those who knew them. This hesitance became more pronounced in 
areas outside of their tribe, the Ait Khabbash. In some cases, interviewees directed me to other 
people, especially shyūkh as-sāqiya, who they believed would be interested in my research. In a 
few cases, I recruited candidates by approaching farmers in their fields and introducing myself 
65 Tom Christiano, “Democracy,” ​The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ​(Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), ​https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/democracy/​. 
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and my research before asking if they wished to participate in an interview. At the beginning of 
each interview, I received oral informed consent from each interviewee.  
My recruitment methods meant that my research results are based on a convenience 
sample. The people participated in this study were male subsistence farmers engaged in 
small-scale canal irrigation in southeastern Morocco. Their ages ranged from 37 to 75. I did not 
actively seek out female interviewees because approaching a woman to ask about farming and 
irrigation would violate social norms that frown upon substantive interactions between men and 
women who are not related by blood or marriage.  
I conducted sixteen interviews in Merzouga, Rissani, Hassi Labied, Fezna, Walad Jalal 
and Khettāret A’ashīsh, which appear in Figure 4.1. I conducted interviews in people’s homes, 
workplaces, and fields. I completed my interview with Muhammad Aoujil outside of 
Drâa-Tafilalet, although he grew up in Merzouga and his father served as shaykh of Tamazant 
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Figure 4.1: Map of interview sites relative to the Moroccan-Algerian border. 
Key: 1: Merzouga, 2: Hassi Labied, 3: Haroun, 4: Fezna and Walad Jalal, 5: Khettāret A’ashīsh 
Observations 
In most cases, I interviewed research participants in or adjacent to their fields, allowing 
me to record field notes about my surroundings. In Khettaret A’ashish and Merzouga, 
interviewees gave me extended tours of their irrigation communities. We walked through fields, 
beside the sāqiya, and along the khettārat while interviewees answered questions and commented 
on our surroundings. In Fezna, Bashir Jakani allowed me to descend into a large, empty khettāra 
that he told me dates to the 11th century. I also photographed interview sites during and after 
each experience. While interviewing the shaykh of Tamazant, a farmer from the Tahafit sāqiya 
community approached the shaykh with a dispute. I observed and took notes during the 
exchange, which formed the beginning of a conflict resolution process. 
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Limitations 
Language sometimes posed a barrier during the interview process. Although I speak 
Modern Standard Arabic and a northern dialect of Moroccan Darija, many people in southeastern 
Morocco speak Tamazight as a first language, which is mutually unintelligible with Arabic. The 
southeastern dialect of Moroccan Darija often incorporates vocabulary from Tamazight. Some of 
that vocabulary is key to discussions about the sāqiya and khettāra. I encountered interviewees 
who used the Tamazight words ​inghorān​ and ​hāssi​ instead of the Arabic ​khettāra​ and ​bīr​ (well). 
To overcome linguistic barriers, I sometimes used Youssef and Said as intermediaries between 
Modern Standard Arabic, local dialects, and Tamazight. Ideally, I would have liked to conduct 
each interview in the dialect or dialects of an interviewee’s choice, which may have included 
French, Tamazight and various dialects of Moroccan Darija. 
My dependence on Youssef and Said limited my results in that I relied on their personal 
connections for the majority of my interviews, which were concentrated mainly in and around 
the town of Merzouga. Their connections outside of the area were more sparse. I did not spend 
enough time in Merzouga to cultivate relationships beyond those of the Aoujil family. If I had 
lived in Merzouga full-time and had fewer time constraints, I would have recruited participants 
more systematically. 
V. Results and Analysis 
Five major themes emerged during my field research: the ways of defining the irrigation 
community, the methods of water distribution, the process of choosing the leader of an irrigation 
community, the responsibilities and authorities of those leaders, and the ways in which irrigation 
communities respond to change. Each of the following subsections addresses one of those 
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themes. Throughout this section, institutional arrangements and management practices reveal the 
underlying democratic values and principles that govern the sāqiya and khettāra. 
Defining the Sāqiya Community 
Defining an irrigation community is crucial to analyzing its political institutions because 
such an analysis requires identifying who creates and participates in those institutions. To 
determine the level of democratic political culture in southeastern Moroccan irrigation 
governance, I must first identify who and what is governed. The flow of the sāqiya clearly 
defines each irrigation community, meaning that people who do not own land adjacent to the 
sāqiya cannot participate in sāqiya institutions or use the sāqiya’s waters. Ostrom confirms the 
importance of such a physical definition, noting that successful irrigation communities need to 
clearly define the area that they serve and the individuals who can use water resources.   66
Figure 5.1 Figure 5.2   Figure 5.3 
Key: Stars represent the governing institutions of towns and squares represent the governing institutions of sāqiya 
communities. 
A sāqiya community may or may not completely overlap with a town or village. In 
Merzouga, the three sāqiya communities of Tamazant, Tahafit, and Tamarikht neighbor one 
another but operate independently. Figure 5.1 represents this configuration, in which the 
community of the town, represented in the figure by a star, contains three irrigation communities, 
66 Mabry, ​Canals and Communities​, 12. 
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which are represented by squares. On the other hand, one khettāra community can comprise of 
individuals from multiple towns. Figure 5.2 shows a multi-town, single-irrigation community 
configuration, with the stars representing towns and the square representing a broader irrigation 
community that uses a common water source. In qsar communities like Haroun, the sāqiya 
community not only overlaps entirely with the qsar community, but the governance structures of 
the sāqiya and the qsar coexist in a common institutional framework. A majles ash-shyūkh 
governs each qsar and elects from among their ranks a shaykh al-ghāba and a shaykh al-qsar. 
The shaykh al-ghāba is responsible for governance of the sāqiya, khettāra and the farmland that 
they irrigate while the shaykh al-qsar is responsible for governance of the fortified town.  Town 67
government and sāqiya institutions may coincide in qsūr due to the longstanding tradition of 
governance by council in those communities, providing a convenient structure which has 
developed in tandem with saqīya governance. Figure 5.3 shows the qsar configuration, where 
governance of a water community and town overlap in a single institution. 
An irrigation community’s name can indicate who that community includes and excludes. 
Naming conventions of irrigation communities vary, with some names describing geographic 
locations while others derive from kinship groups or descriptors of the irrigation community 
itself. The towns of Khettaret A’ashish and Hassi Labied take their names from water 
infrastructure: the former means the khettāra of A’ashish, which is a larger, nearby village, and 
the latter means “white well.” The fact that towns take their names from wells or khettārāt shows 
the significance of water in southeastern Morocco. In other cases, an irrigation community 
borrows its name from the town. This naming practice appears to be especially common when a 
67 Interview with Ali Ou Aabi, December 21, 2017. 
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town only has one irrigation community, as was the case in Walad Jalal. Those names indicate 
that the community can include all landowners in the village. The Tahafit irrigation community 
takes its name from the kinship group that uses it, which is called the Ait Hafit. Naming an 
irrigation community after a kinship group implies that, to some extent, that kinship group has a 
special connection to the community either as founders or exclusive users. Finally, some 
irrigation communities carry names based in their attributes; Tamazant, for example, connotes 
that the community is small while Tamarikht means “salty water.”  Both of those communities 68
include members of various kinship groups within the Ait Khabbash tribe. The variation in 
naming customs for irrigation communities shows that communities define themselves in 
different ways, with some presenting their geographic or kinship affiliations while others 
describe their water. 
Exclusive membership characterizes the sāqiya irrigation communities where I conducted 
interviews. Therefore, only people who pay dues and hold land can use the waters of the sāqiya. 
However, the concept of property ownership in sāqiya communities is blended between 
communal and private. In Merzouga, one individual holds the deed to all of the plots in the 
Tamazant community.  Despite exclusive legal ownership, different families farm their own 69
plots and Moroccan law dictates that they own that land on a de facto basis.  The hybrid land 70
ownership arrangement indicates a high degree of trust among the members of a community and 
a willingness to operate without formalizing land ownership. The physical structures of the 
sāqiya and khettāra are considered communal property, as are their waters. The underlying 
reasons for a hybrid model of land and water ownership remain unclear. However, keeping the 
68 Interview with Muhammad Aoujil, November 6, 2017. 
69 Interview with Ahmed Aoujil, December 18, 2017. 
70 Interview with Ahmed Aoujil, December 18, 2017. 
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sāqiya and khettāra out of private hands ensures that each member of an irrigation community 
holds a stake in maintaining their physical structures, thereby incentivizing collective, 
democratic decision-making. Formalizing land ownership allows members of a sāqiya 
community to more easily define the extent of their communal land without complicating the 
relationships between landowners or needing to secure new deeds to divide up land after 
inheritance. 
Methods of Water Distribution 
Across southeastern Morocco, communities rely on sāqiya irrigation channels for 
small-scale, subsistence agriculture. Those communities grow a variety of crops including date 
palm, carrot, garlic, onion, eggplant, parsnip, beans, tomatoes, okra, barley, cumin, parsley, 
henna, and fodder. For farmers living on the edge of the Sahara, the sāqiya provides a regular 
source of water to irrigate their families’ plots. The satellite images below show the towns of 
Hassi Labied (5.4), Merzouga (5.5), and Khettāret A’ashīsh (5.6), three of the communities in 
which I interviewed farmers about irrigation and the grassroots political institutions that govern 
it. 
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Figure 5.4 (Courtesy of Google Earth): Satellite image of Hassi Labied. 
Figure 5.5 (Courtesy of Google Earth): Satellite image of Merzouga. 
Figure 5.6 (Courtesy of Google Earth): Satellite image of Khettaret A’ashish 
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Each sāqiya community I visited distributes water to stakeholders on a rotation in which 
each water holder is allocated a certain amount of time to irrigate their fields in proportion to the 
size of their plot. Figure 5.7 shows a sāqiya channel flowing in Merzouga. In the lower left 
corner of the photo, an earthen barrier blocks the water from flooding a plot. To inundate their 
plots, a farmer removes the barrier with a shovel during their allotted time and then replaces the 
barrier when their time slot ends. Figure 5.8 shows water flowing out of the sāqiya, streaming 
down the slight incline of a farmer’s land to flood one plot and then continue into the next. 
Figure 5.7: The sāqiya in Merzouga. Figure 5.8: Inundating a plot.
 
The number of days in a rotation is typically based on the original number of families 
who established a sāqiya community. Table 5.1 shows a 4-day cycle with eight plots. As I found 
in most communities, each plot shown in the table switches between time slots during the day 
and during the night to balance against the effects of evaporation.  
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Table 5.1: Sample irrigation cycle.  
 In practice, most communities use rotations more complex than the one outlined in Table 
5.1. Four families established the Tamazant community in Merzouga in the 1950s. Because four 
families started Tamazant, the rotation consists of a number of days divisible by four. Today, 
Tamazant’s sixteen plots, which are themselves divided into sub-plots, associate with time slots 
on an eight-day cycle and switch off between a daytime and nighttime slot.  Since Tamazant is a 71
relatively small sāqiya community, its rotation is relatively simple.  
By contrast, seven families established Khettaret A’ashish, which operates on a 
seven-day cycle in the summer and a fourteen-day cycle in the winter. Each family originally 
held water rights for a full day of the summer cycle and divided that day among their members.  72
Today, the descendants of the original families each hold rights to a time slot proportional to the 
size of their plot. If one landholder owned a quarter of one family’s original plot, they would 
receive six hours of water in the summer, switching off each cycle between nighttime and 
daytime slots. In practice, those slots are often divided into half-hour increments. 
71Interview with Muhammad Ait Khuya, December 19, 2017.  
72Interview with Muhammad Lquz, December 20, 2017. 
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Figure 5.9: The sāqiya of Khettaret A’ashish 
Scholars have developed two broad categories for understanding the link between land 
ownership and water rights in irrigation communities: the Yemenite and Syrian models. In the 
Syrian model, water rights are inseparable from land ownership and are distributed in proportion 
to the extent of land. In the Yemenite model, land ownership and water rights function 
independently from one another. Both models exist in Morocco. In a sāqiya irrigation system in 
the Saiss region, “one can inherit, buy, hire, exchange or borrow water from an owner, 
independent of land ownership.”  In the sāqiya communities where I conducted research, land 73
and water rights are not usually separable on a permanent basis, and therefore a plot is tied to a 
given time slot. However, landowners may choose to sell or trade their time slot when their fields 
lie fallow or to trade a portion of their time slot in order to consistently irrigate their crops during 
summer months, especially in the case of long cycles that could leave fields without water for 
73 Van der Kooij, Zwarteveen, and Kuper, “The material of the social,” 136. 
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more than ten days at a time.  Therefore, understandings of water rights in my interviews 74
generally appear consistent with the Syrian model, in which water rights are tied to land and 
fluctuations in water output from the sāqiya and khettāra are evenly distributed among 
stakeholders.  However, the potential for a transition to the Yemenite model of water rights, in 75
which individual farmers hold water rights separate from their land rights, is also apparent in that 
time slots can be traded and sold, albeit temporarily.  Under that model, individual farmers can 76
buy others’ time slots to compensate for periods of low water in the sāqiya.  
When an heir inherits land belonging to an irrigation community, they also inherit an 
associated time slot for irrigation. Landholders often subdivide their plot among their sons, who 
receive time slots proportional to the size of their plot. In large sāqiya communities, this practice 
results in some farmers having crops that receive as little as half an hour of water each cycle. 
Choosing Leaders 
The communities in which I conducted interviews use consensus-based, representative 
institutions to select shyūkh as-sāqiya, who are water chiefs responsible for overseeing an 
irrigation community’s technical and institutional components. The reliance on consensus and 
representation in the irrigation communities I researched demonstrates part of a democratic 
political culture. Those types of institutional values are not universal across small irrigation 
communities. For instance, an alternate model of choosing an irrigation community leader 
appears in the Faiyum depression of Egypt, where “the largest landholder usually administers the 
operation and maintenance… and also arbitrates conflicts.”  77
74 Interview with Muhammad An’aam, December 19, 2017. 
75 Mabry, ​Canals and Communities​, 17. 
76 Mabry, ​Canals and Communities​, 17. 
77 Mabry, ​Canals and Communities​, 8. 
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In the communities that I studied, farmers elect shyūkh as-sāqiya from the members of an 
irrigation community. Smaller communities tend to have less rigid institutions governing the 
election process and the length of a shaykh’s term. For example, the shaykh of Tamazant has 
served in his position for about 20 years and is the fourth person to occupy the position since the 
community’s establishment in the late 1950s.  However, even in the case of institutions without 78
rigid term lengths, a political culture based on a shaykh’s accountability to his community was 
evident. The irrigation communities that I researched operate on consensual authority, which 
Scarborough defines as “organization and control of a water management system develop from a 
diffuse, collective societal consciousness or understanding.  Scarborough’s definition of 79
consensual authority connects both to Joffé’s concept of consensus as a part of democratic 
political culture and to broader themes of collective decision-making in democratic institutions.  80
Members of irrigation communities expressed high trust in governing institutions and indicated 
that their shyūkh served at the will of their communities. Tamazant stakeholders reported that 
they could call for a meeting to choose a new shaykh based on consensus of landholders if the 
current shaykh failed to perform his duties effectively. For instance, the shaykh as-sāqiya in 
Hassi Labied said that he began serving when the former shaykh could no longer serve due to 
failing eyesight.  In contrast to the flexible term lengths of the small Tamazant community, the 81
sāqiya community in Khettaret A’ashish provides water to about 500 people and the shaykh 
78 Interview with Muhammad Ait Khuya, December 19, 2017; Interview with Ali Ait Hassan, December 
19, 2017. 
79 Scarborough, ​The Flow of Power​,  21, quoting Geertz; Glick, ​Irrigation and Society in Medieval 
Valencia​. 
80 Joffé, “Traditions of governance in North Africa,” 722; Christiano, “Democracy.”  
81 Interview with Mbarek Ou ‘Abu, December 19, 2017. 
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consistently serves a term of one to three years. Then, men in the community nominate potential 
leaders and come together to choose a new shaykh as-sāqiya from among the nominees.   82
In each sāqiya community, the shaykh as-sāqiya directly interacts with representatives 
elected to serve a portion of stakeholders. Representation is usually based on the physical 
division of the sāqiya community into strips that run parallel to the sāqiya. In Tamazant, sixteen 
water holders divide into four groups, each of which appoints a representative to serve on a 
council that interacts directly with the shaykh. Of those four, one person serves as the shaykh’s 
deputy while another serves as treasurer. Larger irrigation communities have more complex 
representation arrangements. 
Qsar communities are fortified villages that predate most other towns in Drâa-Tafilalet 
and use a model of irrigation community governance integrated with broader community 
governance. In qsūr around Rissani, ​majāles ash-shyūkh ​(s. ​majles ash-shyūkh​), or councils of 
chiefs, govern communities and choose among themselves a shaykh specifically responsible for 
the sāqiya.  That shaykh serves for a year before the majles selects a new shaykh as-sāqiya. The 83
major kinship groups that constitute a qsar elect a representative to serve on the majles. The 
Rissani qsūr are distinct from other examples because the governance of the sāqiya community is 
embedded within a broader structure for governing the qsar, whereas other towns had irrigation 
governance structures disassociated from other governance structures. The majāles also show 
that representative democratic institutions function in southeast Morocco’s informal qsar 
governments, extending beyond structures dedicated exclusively to irrigation. 
82 Interview with Muhammad Lquz, December 20, 2017. 
83 Interview with Ali Ou Aabi, December 21, 2017. 
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In terms of the election process, the most significant outlier in my research came in 
Fezna, where three interviewees reported that the shaykh as-sāqiya inherited his position from 
his father without an election.  However, the two older interviewees reported that the shift to a 84
hereditary system of succession occurred within their lifetime and that the sāqiya community 
selected previous shyūkh through elections. The example of Fezna supports the scholarly 
consensus that posits larger irrigation communities correlate with more centralized institutions.   85
Regardless of the institutional framework used to choose a shaykh, interviewees reported 
that they voted based on a candidate’s knowledge of sāqiya customs and experience mediating 
conflict. A new shaykh typically does not have any specialized training in these topics but rather 
has engaged with their community as a stakeholder and worked alongside former shyūkh in 
planning renovation projects or mediating conflicts. They may have previously served as a 
deputy or treasurer for their sāqiya community and proved their competence in that manner.  
Although women do help farm their family plots, I never encountered a female shaykh or 
heard of one during my research.  The image of a shaykh in southeastern Morocco remains that 86
of an old man. Furthermore, only heads of families attend the meetings in which a community 
chooses a shaykh, and those heads of families are men. Gender limitations are an undemocratic 
element of sāqiya governance. However, a consensus-based political culture surrounds the 
institution of shaykh as-sāqiya, meaning that shyūkh serve at the pleasure of their (male) 
constituents and can be removed by them in the case of underperformance.  
Limiting voting rights to heads of families is another undemocratic aspect of sāqiya 
governance. Regardless of how many people belong to a family or how much land a family 
84 Interview with Bashir Jakani, December 20, 2017. 
85 Mabry, ​Canals and Communities​, 9 
86 Interview with Muhammad Lquz, December 20, 2017. 
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owns, one water holder represents each family in the decision-making process. However, an 
irrigation community in the Saiss region shows how decision making can expand beyond heads 
of families to include both male and female community members.   87
Responsibilities and Authorities of the Shaykh as-Sāqiya 
The responsibilities and authorities of shyūkh as-sāqiya were consistent across the 
communities where I completed interviews. Interviewees listed the main areas of responsibility 
for shyūkh as overseeing maintenance, collecting resources, calling meetings of the sāqiya 
community, resolving conflicts, and enforcing norms. The balance of responsibilities and 
authorities for shyūkh as-sāqiya shows that irrigation communities confer authority upon leaders 
and expect those leaders to fulfill certain duties. Such an arrangement demonstrates the presence 
of a revocable social contract in irrigation communities. The balance of responsibilities and 
authorities also indicates that final authority lies with the irrigation community, which can 
collectively retract their consent to be governed and then elect a new shaykh. 
Shyūkh oversee routine maintenance of the physical structures of the sāqiya and khettāra. 
To determine whether maintenance is necessary, the shyūkh regularly ride along the khettāra to 
check for collapses in the tunnel or interruptions in the flow of water.  The underground tunnels 88
of a khettāra are prone to collapse when subjected to large shifts of mass above them. In 
Merzouga, rally cars repeatedly drive over the tunnels during the annual Merzouga Rally and 
their weight sometimes collapses the tunnels.  In Khettāret A’ashīsh, one farmer reported that 89
abundant rainfall and tree roots growing into the khettāra also cause collapse.  Monitoring, 90
87 Van der Kooij, Zwarteveen, and Kuper, “The material of the social,” 136. 
88 Interview with Bashir Jakani, December 20, 2017. 
89 Interview with Said al-Fellah, December 18, 2017. 
90 Interview with Muhammad Lquz, December 20, 2017. 
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maintaining, and repairing the khettāra require significant financial and human resources that the 
shaykh must mobilize, primarily from the irrigation community but sometimes with support from 
the regional government or NGO partners. Additionally, the sāqiya often fills with sand during 
the windy season, requiring periodic cleaning to ensure that water flows. Contributing and 
mobilizing resources is an accepted and understood element of the sāqiya community, a core 
element of community membership and a prerequisite to use of its resources. The expectation of 
individual participation in the irrigation community strengthens the legitimacy of communal 
governance, the community’s democratic ethos, and the informal social contract established 
among stakeholders. 
To oversee the sāqiya community, a shaykh may collect money and labor from farmers in 
proportion to the extent of their lands and consequently the length of their time slots. A treasurer 
manages each sāqiya community’s finances. Each member of a water community is expected to 
contribute either labor or money to maintain the sāqiya. Interviewees indicated that they pay 
regular dues in proportionate to the amount of land owned.  When physical structures of the 91
khettāra collapse, a shaykh collects additional funds to fund large scale repair structures, which 
can require renting equipment, buying construction materials, and mobilizing labor. 
The shaykh has the authority to call meetings of the sāqiya community or their 
representatives. However, a shaykh’s authority is not exclusive. Using the representative 
institutions in place, sāqiya stakeholders can call a meeting of the community to replace a shaykh 
who is not effectively performing his duties.  92
91 Interview with Muhammad Lquz, December 20, 2017; Interview with Sayyid ‘Abd al-Rahman, 
December 20, 2017. 
92 Interview with Lhassan Ou L’arbi, December 18, 2017. 
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As I interviewed Muhammad Ait Khuya, the shaykh of the Tamazant irrigation 
community, a farmer from the neighboring Tahafit irrigation community approached on his bike. 
A small earthen dam separates the Tamazant and Tahafit communities to prevent Tahafit 
rainwater from flowing out of their plots downhill to Tamazant and to clearly delineate the two 
communities. The Tahafit farmer owned a plot of land bordering the Tahafit side of the dam. 
Because earth from the dam had started collapsing onto his palm trees and invading his plot, the 
farmer wanted to clear the earth out of his plot. However, the shaykh claimed that the farmer 
should not have planted palm trees so close to the dam in the first place. In order to resolve the 
conflict and determine who ought to be liable if the dam collapsed further, the farmer and the 
shaykh agreed to meet at the dam itself along with the Tahafit shaykh and witnesses to reach an 
agreement. This case shows another of the shaykh’s responsibilities: mediating intra- and 
inter-community conflict. For intra-community conflict, the mediation process begins with 
meetings with parties to a conflict to hear each side.  Then, a shaykh convenes a meeting 93
between the parties and mediates a conversation between them to work towards a resolution.  
Ali Ou al-Aabi, a farmer in Haroun, told me that people stakeholders generally prefer 
locally-based conflict resolution to arbitration in the courts, which only occurs rarely.  As 94
Mabry notes, “decisions may be appealed,” but “each step upward in the hierarchy of [conflict 
resolution] options represents a decrease in local autonomy and an increase in social cost.”  In 95
the case of conflicts between sāqiya communities, the shaykh represents his constituency in talks 
with the other shaykh. Ahmed Aoujil recounted a story about a dispute that reached the formal 
court system. When a Tamazant farmer’s bulldozer felled a tree in the Tahafit irrigation 
93 Interview with Bashir Jakani, December 20, 2017. 
94 Interview with Ali Ou al-Aabi, December 21, 2017. 
95 Mabry, ​Canals and Communities​, 19. 
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community, shaykh-to-shaykh mediation failed and instead each shaykh represented their 
respective community in the judicial system. Members of the Tamazant sāqiya community 
contributed to a legal defense fund that the shaykh used during the arbitration process.   96
Shyūkh enforce norms surrounding irrigation communities by levying fines and ensuring 
that violators of norms cannot use the sāqiya’s waters without paying a fine in either money or 
extra labor for a maintenance project.  When a farmer does not pay their dues, the shaykh 97
ensures that they cannot use the sāqiya until they do so, exemplifying the contractual, albeit 
informal, nature of community membership.   98
Facing State Intervention, Social Transformation, and Environmental Change 
Although the sāqiya and khettāra are traditional systems, they are not frozen in time. The 
institutions governing the sāqiya and khettāra are fluid; they have evolved and will continue to 
do so. In order to demonstrate the dynamic nature of the sāqiya and khettāra institutions and to 
extrapolate how current trends will affect them, this section discusses external factors that test 
the flexibility and sustainability of southeastern Morocco’s grassroots irrigation. State 
intervention through centralized irrigation, social transformation resulting from economic 
pressures, and environmental change all pose challenges for sāqiya and khettāra irrigation.  
For centuries, the Ziz Valley of southeastern Morocco has attracted outsiders. The 
renowned travelers Ibn Battuta and Leo Africanus, visiting the Ziz Valley centuries apart from 
one another, would have seen the lush farmlands of the oasis and its mud-brick villages. Today, 
the dune sea of Erg Chebbi attracts an altogether different sort of visitor: tourists. Drawn to the 
relative political stability of Morocco and enchanted by the golden sands of Merzouga, tourists 
96 Interview with Ahmed Aoujil, December 18, 2017.  
97 Interview with Bashir Jakani, December 20, 2017. 
98 Interview with Muhammad Yussuf, December 19, 2017. 
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from across Morocco and around the world pour by the busload into the 1500-person village. For 
most, Merzouga is little more than a stop on the way to a camel trek into Erg Chebbi. Often, 
visitors wander the town while waiting for their camels, perhaps buying a headwrap or a local 
fossil before riding a well-trod path to a camp in the dunes. Local guides show off their skills in 
English, Spanish, French, and Korean, but they speak to one another in Tamazight. A chain of 
tourists rides in a caravan, with each camel tied to the one before it, eventually ending with a 
guide who wears a sky-blue djellaba embroidered with gold thread and a blue turban, often 
concealing a pair of jeans and a t-shirt. In Merzouga, authenticity sells. Each year that more 
tourists come to Merzouga, the families running camel trek businesses hire more guides to walk 
tourist-laden camels into the desert and drop them off at a camp, many of them fully equipped 
with small generators, a toilet, and drinking water. When given the chance to seek out gratuities 
from tourists enchanted by a sunset over the dunes and a hearty Moroccan meal, many people, 
especially young people, eagerly enter the tourism sector.  
My interviews indicated that social change destabilizes sāqiya irrigation communities and 
can potentially result in their collapse. Many interviewees reported a shift away from subsistence 
agriculture and towards tourism. Merzouga has become one of the most popular tourist sites in 
Morocco, attracting domestic visitors who come for therapeutic sand baths and international 
visitors who take camel treks, ride ATVs, and camp in the Erg Chebbi dunes. Merzouga’s 
international tourism sector began to develop in the late 1980s and has continued to grow as the 
number of foreign tourists to Morocco increases.  Morocco suffers from a youth unemployment 99
rate of 26.5 percent as of late 2018, meaning that young people in places like Merzouga leap at 
99 Laurent Gagnol and Pierre-Antoine Landel, "Psammotourism: Desert Sand as a Specific Resource and 
Touristic Experience," Tourism Review, no. 10 (2016). 
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the opportunity to find a job.  As young people work in the tourism sector, their commitment to 100
subsistence agriculture decreases and irrigation community institutions weaken. Shyūkh need 
their irrigation community to provide the financial support and labor that maintain the physical 
structures of the sāqiya and khettāra. However, as younger generations increasingly gain 
employment in the tourism sector, their incentive to farm and contribute to their irrigation 
community decreases. In towns such as Hassi Labied and Merzouga, which are major centers of 
tourism due to their proximity to the Erg Chebbi dunes, socio-economic factors threaten 
irrigation community stability more than they do in other areas.  
Salem Bokbot previously served as the shaykh of Tamarikht, one of Merzouga’s three 
sāqiya irrigation communities until it dissolved in 2017 after 59 years. When I spoke with Salem, 
he told me that ten families originally farmed plots in the Tamarikht land, but as water holders 
sought work in other regions or sectors, they left their fields barren and did not contribute to the 
upkeep of the sāqiya and khettāra.  A major sandstorm shifted large amounts of sand and 101
resulted in the physical collapse of a portion of the khettāra, cutting off the flow of water to the 
sāqiya. That collapse precipitated the eventual dissolution of the Tamarikht irrigation 
community. Facing high costs to repair the khettāra and lacking funds or labor, Salem called a 
meeting of the families who owned the farmland and they agreed to dissolve the irrigation 
community. Lhassan Ou L’arbi, shaykh of the neighboring Tahafit irrigation community in 
Merzouga, expressed his concern that the sāqiya would die with the current generation of 
farmers.  Brahim, a farmer in Tamazant, lamented that the system functioned more 102
100France 24, “al-maghreb: al-batāla fī sufūf ash-shabāb ‘qanbala mawqūta’ wa sabab ra’īsī lil-qalaq 
al-ijtimā’ī,” November 2, 2018, https://www.france24.com/ar/20180211-تﺎﺟﺎﺠﺘﺣا-ﺔﺗﻮﻗﻮﻣ-ﺔﻠﺒﻨﻗ-بﺎﺒﺷ-ﺔﻟﺎﻄﺑ-بﺮﻐﻤﻟا. 
101 Interview with Salem Bokbot, December 19, 2017. 
102 Interview with Lhassan Ou L’arbi, December 18, 2017. 
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democratically when everyone worked and contributed and complained that young people do not 
recognize the value of natural farming.  Without a sustained commitment to agricultural 103
production, irrigation communities cannot maintain the physical structures of the sāqiya and 
khettāra. When maintenance demands exceed the capacity of an irrigation community, that 
irrigation community risks extinction. However, interviewees in towns such as Khettaret 
A’ashish, which is located far from tourist areas, were far more optimistic about institutional 
longevity. The difference in outlook between Khettaret A’ashish and Merzouga reinforces the 
idea that socio-economic change can undermine an irrigation community’s sustainability. 
Tourism also places stress on local infrastructure, requiring people to turn to the sāqiya 
for household use and drinking water. The shaykh of Tamazant in Merzouga reported that 
pressures on water supplies in the town reach their peak during the summer, when tourists at 
local hotels consume the largest amounts of water.  Using the sāqiya for domestic purposes 104
increases stress on the sāqiya and khettāra system as a whole. Additionally, drinking from the 
Tamazant sāqiya can result in sickness and turn people’s teeth brown.  
Environmental change in pre-Saharan communities will likely result in more 
intra-community conflicts over water usage. Lhassan Ou L’arbi, shaykh of the Tahafit sāqiya in 
Merzouga, said that his job as a shaykh becomes more difficult when water is scarce.  105
According to Lhassan, disagreements over water arise more often in times of drought, when the 
stakes of misallocation of water run higher. Droughts are common in southeastern Morocco due 
to its proximity to the Sahara. Since 1912, Morocco has experienced about 27 years of drought.
103 Interview with Brahim Zawiya, December 19, 2017. 
104 Interview with Muhammad Ait Khuya, December 19, 2017. 
105 Interview with Lhassan Ou L’arbi, December 18, 2017. 
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 However, the khettāra and sāqiya irrigation system mitigates the impact of droughts by 106
drawing from relatively consistent water sources like aquifers and mountain springs to 
compensate for low rainfall. According to Will Swearingen, droughts have increased in 
frequency in North Africa since 1980 and will gradually increase due to climate change.  107
Climate change will also intensify the effects of droughts.  Drought can force waves of 108
rural-to-urban migration, which weakens the social and political structure of irrigation 
communities. That was the fate of many kuhl irrigation systems in India’s Kangra Valley, where 
“out-migration has created acute labor shortages that has challenged farmers’ capacities for 
mobilizing collective labor for annual kuhl repair and maintenance.”  In addition to damaging 109
institutions in rural communities, rural-to-urban migration destabilizes urban areas when rural 
migrants “join the large number of urban poor living in overcrowded slum areas with little access 
to basic physical and social infrastructure.”  As demonstrated in Tamarikht, a decrease in the 110
population of a sāqiya community can also result in collapse when large maintenance projects 
require more labor or money than a community can provide. 
 The building of Hassan ad-Dākhil dam demonstrates how sāqiya community institutions 
can adjust to centrally-planned, large-scale irrigation projects. In my interviews, stakeholders 
described their irrigation communities as mostly self-sufficient, only rarely taking funds from the 
regional government and aid organizations. Interviewees never mentioned sub-regional 
governments. With that said, the national government does interact with the sāqiya and khettāra 
106 Swearingen, ​The North African Environment at Risk​, 20. 
107 Swearingen, ​The North African Environment at Risk​, 17. 
108 Kevin Trenberth et al, “Global Warming and Changes in Drought,” 17. 
109 Mark Baker, ​The Kuhls of Kangra: Community-managed Irrigation in the Western Himalaya​ (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2007), 4. 
110 Ghanem, "Agriculture and Rural Development for Inclusive Growth and Food Security in Morocco," 1. 
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in less direct ways. State intervention in the Ziz River, which provides intermittent water to some 
of the communities that I visited and forms the core of the Tafilalet oasis, initially destabilized 
small-scale, indigenous irrigation using the sāqiya and khettāra. In January 1968, King Hassan II 
broke ground on the Hassan ad-Dākhil Dam, which stemmed the flow of the Ziz River and 
formed a reservoir near Errachidia, one of the largest cities in southeastern Morocco. Instead of 
flowing freely, the waters of the Ziz could be controlled through a concrete canal running over 
sixty miles south from Errachidia to Merzouga.  The dam project sought to irrigate one million 111
hectares of land by transporting rainwater southwards from Errachidia while preventing 
catastrophic flooding of the sort that occurred in 1965.  In ​The​ ​Last Civilized Place​,​ ​Ronald 112
Messier and James Miller note that, although farmers initially demonstrated suspicion towards 
“government water” in the first decades of the dam’s operation, they have since acclimated to 
centralized water flowing from Errachidia.  Said al-Fellah, a farmer in the Tamazant sāqiya 113
community, confirmed that shyūkh as-sāqiya now regularly communicate with irrigation 
administrators in Errachidia to prepare for and adjust to supplementary water from the reservoir.
  114
The case of the Hassan ad-Dākhil Dam complicates the archaeologist Jonathan Mabry’s 
claim that irrigation systems imposed from above fail to achieve the same sustainability and 
stability as small-scale, grassroots irrigation systems.  In Merzouga, a combination of local and 115
111 State intervention in the Ziz River is not new; some experts believe that the entirety of the southern Ziz 
River took its current form after a major diversion in the medieval period, (Messier and Miller, ​The Last Civilized 
Place​, 51). 
112 Messier and Miller, ​The Last Civilized Place​, 39; Akhbar Errachidia, ​"Quset Binaa Sed Al-hassan 
Al-dakhil," ​accessed December 04, 2018, ​http://akhbarerrachidia.over-blog.com/article-114206511.html​. 
113 Messier and Miller, ​The Last Civilized Place​, 188. 
114 Interview with Said al-Fellah, December 18, 2017.  
115 Mabry, ​Canals and Communities​, 20. 
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national irrigation system reached an institutional equilibrium in which shyūkh interact with 
central irrigation authorities without relying on a consistent supply of water from the dam. 
Despite institutional functionality, water from the concrete canals running from the Hassan 
ad-Dākhil reservoir evaporates at a faster rate than water that runs through the khettāra’s 
underground tunnels.  
VI. Conclusions 
King Muhammad VI rules Morocco because his father, King Hassan II, ruled Morocco. 
Royal palaces stand in cities across the country. Royal advisors, allies, and appointees control the 
distribution of key resources. Royal portraits appear in shops and private homes. Royal-owned 
businesses dominate many sectors of the Moroccan economy. However, the institutions that 
govern southeastern Morocco’s sāqiya and khettāra are based in democratic values. When 
farmers choose the people who manage and oversee the sāqiya and khettāra irrigation systems, 
they do so based on a communal consensus. Authority in an irrigation community originates 
from the will of those farmers. Shyūkh govern by consulting with representatives of groups of 
farmers. In southeastern Morocco, I found a grassroots water democracy much like the one I 
knew from New Mexico’s acequia communities. 
The existence of grassroots water democracies in southeastern Morocco contradicts 
claims of a primordial Middle Eastern and North African incompatibility with democracy. My 
research draws from a few communities at the edge of the Sahara, but the implications for 
regional political culture are far broader. The institutions that govern the sāqiya and khettāra in 
southeastern Morocco underscore the diversity of configurations for local governance in the 
region. Just as Amartya Sen emphasized the variety of philosophical traditions of governance, 
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this research shows the variety of informal traditions of governance; even in the Kingdom of 
Morocco, informal democratic institutions thrive at the community level. That conclusion 
contributes to George Joffé’s work describing North African political institutions built on 
consensus and consultation. Building on Elinor Ostrom’s findings about governing the 
commons, institutions similar to those of the sāqiya and khettāra may govern water or other 
common-pool resources across the Middle East and North Africa.  
Although Morocco does lie at the edge of the Arab world, many of its circumstances, 
whether they be environmental, cultural, political, or economic, are not dissimilar to those found 
in other parts of the region. Therefore, Moroccan marginality within the Arab world and its 
Amazigh substratum does not limit the implications of this research. Rather, this research shows 
the potential for finding similar governing structures in other Middle Eastern and North African 
societies and shows that grassroots water governance may hold the seeds of democratic political 
culture, even in countries perceived to be undemocratic. 
Sāqiya and khettāra governance does not bear the egalitarian ethos of liberal democracies 
in the United States or Europe. When it comes to the participation, no semblance of gender parity 
exists in the irrigation community. Only men who hold water rights participate in electoral 
processes, which violates the democratic principle of equality between community members. 
It would be unreasonable to expect informal institutions that have evolved organically to 
perfectly resemble the outcome of centuries of deliberate constitutional reform. As Joffé writes, 
“grassroots examples of participatory governance, despite their defects arising from the roles of 
patronage-clientage and gender bias, also demonstrate mechanisms for the dispersal of predatory 
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power and popular engagement.”  Mature liberal democracy does not come ready-made. 116
However, democratic institutions need not be formalized to make up the base of a democratic 
society.  In southeastern Morocco, an indigenous water democracy lies at the foundation of 
society. Recognizing that fact can broaden the ways that academics and policymakers see 
traditional politics in North Africa and the region’s political culture as a whole. 
My research indicates that the most severe threat facing the sustainability of the khettāra 
and sāqiya is social and economic change that could trigger the collapse of irrigation 
communities. As the Moroccan tourism sector grows, the younger generation of would-be 
farmers will be incentivized to seek employment as guides, drivers, and other service workers. 
As older generations stop farming, more irrigation communities will face collapse. The collapse 
of khettāra and sāqiya systems will mean not only a decline in agricultural production and food 
security, but also the disappearance of a vital social and political institution. A second threat to 
institutional longevity lies in increasing water scarcity, which could manifest itself in multiple 
ways harmful to an irrigation community. However, it appears that the institutions governing 
small-scale irrigation in southeastern Morocco have adjusted well to the introduction of 
centralized, large-scale irrigation. Especially since the national policy is shifting to local control 
of irrigation, conflicts between local and national systems of irrigations are unlikely to threaten 
the institutions I studied. 
My core conclusion -- that institutions governing irrigation in southeastern Morocco are 
rooted in democratic values -- raises an important question: what is the connection between 
grassroots political culture and the political culture of governing a country? Although Morocco 
116 Joffé, “Traditions of governance in North Africa,” 732. 
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has progressed towards a parliamentary democracy in recent decades, it remains a largely 
authoritarian monarchy. Why have local, informal democratic norms not risen to the national 
level? Significant institutional distance separates the sāqiya and khettāra from the Kingdom of 
Morocco; where is the disconnect between local institutions and national ones? Future projects 
could build on my research and that of Joffé, Gellner, and Hart by clarifying the relationship 
between grassroots and national political cultures. 
Further studies should examine why some sāqiya and khettāra institutions grow more 
authoritarian. I hypothesize that larger irrigation communities may correlate with the breakdown 
of democratic institutions due to increased incentives for individuals to seek power. The case of 
Fezna deserves more attention and could serve as a case study that illuminates how 
consensus-based institutions for choosing shyūkh as-sāqiya can decay. In an era marked by a 
global democratic backsliding, examining grassroots institutional decay could explain why 
institutions turn towards autocracy. 
On the other hand, further studies could also explore the potential for democratization of 
khettāra and sāqiya. By examining how sāqiya and khettāra communities expand the franchise to 
amplify more voices, scholars could gain insight into the conditions that encourage grassroots 
democratic expansion. One example in Saiss shows that formalization could result in more 
equitable participation for all members of an irrigation community.  By examining other 117
irrigation communities in other parts of Morocco, scholars could determine the correlation 
between environmental, institutional, or cultural factors and the level of democracy in an 
irrigation community. 
117 Van der Kooij, Zwarteveen, and Kuper, “The material of the social,” 136. 
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Sitting in plastic chairs outside of a garage overlooking the rocky plateau that precedes 
Merzouga’s dunes, Muhammad Yusuf described his relationship with the sāqiya. “I am a son of 
the sāqiya,” he told me, “it is like my mother; it raised me; it taught me.”  I remembered the 118
acequia stories that my own mother told me. Running alongside the ditches in Albuquerque’s 
North Valley. Plucking frogs from the water. Chasing her dog as the waters carried it 
downstream. Before the Tamazant sāqiya emerges from underground, it flows through a concrete 
tunnel, painted in blue and white, that reads “water is life” in Arabic, Tamazight, French, 
English, and Spanish. In Morocco, people understand the importance of water. Farmers like the 
ones I spoke with understand the importance of water so much that, instead of fighting over 
scarce resources, they have built physical structures and cooperative institutions to distribute 
water among members of their community based on democratic values.  
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IX. Appendix 
Interview Questions (Translated from Arabic) 
 
Demographic Questions 
1- How old are you? 
2- What is your name? 
3- What is your relationship with the sāqiya irrigation system? 
 
General Sāqiya Questions 
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4- Could you please describe the sāqiya irrigation system to me? 
5- Who is allowed to use water from the sāqiya? 
6- Who oversees the sāqiya irrigation system and what are their responsibilities? 
7- What are the sources of funding for the sāqiya irrigation system? 
8- What are some of the problems connected with the sāqiya irrigation system? 
9- What are the rules of the sāqiya and where do they come from? 
10- What are the main priorities in water distribution using the sāqiya irrigation system? 
11- Is there any relationship between the government and the sāqiya irrigation system? 
12- How is the sāqiya irrigation system repaired and maintained? 
13- Who owns the sāqiya irrigation system? 
14- Have there been any major changes in the sāqiya irrigation system that you can 
remember? 
15- As far as you know, what is the history of the sāqiya irrigation system? 
 
Specific Sāqiya Community Questions 
 
15- What is the name of this sāqiya and what is the meaning of the name? 
16- How many people farm using this sāqiya? 
17- How long is the sāqiya? 
18- As far as you know, what is the history of this specific sāqiya? 
 
 
 
